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Brexit and Scotland 
[ab]Two themes, temporality and cosmopolitanism, repeatedly arose during 
conversations in Scotland with people who favored remaining in the 
European Union. The 2016 referendum’s result in favor leaving the EU has 
affected how they think about their temporal trajectories and what they 
might do to maintain their cosmopolitan ideals, which are now deeply 
shaken. Both Scots and non-UK EU nationals living in Scotland must confront 
the uncertainty of what impact Brexit will have on the freedom of trade and 
movement. This uncertainty provokes a new set of anxieties, expectations, 
and speculations as they contemplate how these changes might affect them 
personally. They feel especially uncomfortable that cosmopolitanism has 
become entwined with the nationalist projects of both Edinburgh and 
London. [temporality, cosmopolitanism, nationalism, Brexit, Scotland, United 
Kingdom, European Union] 
[dc]Dennis felt his eyes welling up with tears as he looked over the small 
print of a UK Permanent Residence application, which he was completing for 
his partner, Giovanna, an Italian national.1 A 35-year-old working-class 
Englishman, Dennis was already tired from peering through the darkness of 
the small hours at the television to watch the fallout of the historic UK 
referendum on European Union membership. He felt empty, persecuted, 
stripped of the very core of what he had believed to mean “England”—
cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism, open-mindedness, social liberties. For, 
although he and Giovanna had lived in Scotland (which voted 
overwhelmingly to remain in the European Union) for the past seven years, 
he lamented that the Brexit result was very much an “English ‘victory.’” The 
brightly colored results map confirmed that his compatriots had disowned 
him. “Not much less than an act of treason,” he proclaimed. He told me that 
bitter questions kept flashing across his mind: “Why should we have to do 
this?” “Who is making us fill in this form?” “What right have they to force me 
into this decision?” 
As we sat at his dining-room table, 85 sheets of paper spread out 
before us, tears started trickling down his cheek, inky ripples dispersing 
across page 15 of the UK Visas and Immigration document. With half their 
family in Italy and having recently secured employment in a sector heavily 
reliant on EU trade deals, Dennis and Giovanna saw their immediate future 
as quite uncertain. This was exactly what Dennis had told his mother would 
happen, he kept muttering, if the voting public were persuaded by the 
leading proponents of Brexit—former mayor of London Boris Johnson and 
Nigel Farage, the leader of the right-wing UK Independence Party. Their call 
to arms used a rhetoric of intolerance toward alterity, which they linked to 
the very real pains incurred during eight years of fiscal austerity. 
Dennis, who is a manager of a small electronics outlet store and the 
first person in his family to receive a university education, described feeling 
sick to his stomach about his English identity. Brexit felt like a personal and 
professional attack on him, his family, and his beliefs in British national 
identity. He was so disappointed with his compatriots, particularly on behalf 
of the youth who generally voted to remain part of the European Union, 
although he tried to understand their reasons for wanting to leave—
something he ascribed to excruciating austerity, job losses, and the 
incessant plundering of national resources by big business and the political 
class. He was proud of his working-class background and said he was 
frustrated at how Brexit was being portrayed as a new era of class warfare. 
Sweeping class categorizations, he suggested, overlook complex individual 
circumstances, such as when “a working-class man marries a foreigner.” 
I felt Dennis’s pain. From the upper-working-class southwest of 
England, my family, like Dennis’s and so many others, was also split 
between the opposing camps of Leave and Remain. My arguments for the 
merits of cosmopolitanism, European freedoms, and the potential impact on 
our own family (my partner is also a non-British EU citizen) were often 
rebutted with anecdotes of struggles to find secure employment, migrants’ 
alleged criminal activities, and the need to control national borders. Even 
then I felt that this referendum would be hijacked, like Greece’s referendum 
on a financial bailout plan in July 2015 and the Italian vote on constitutional 
reform in December 2016; the question on the ballot served short-term 
political gains by manipulating voters, playing on the insecurities of a public 
tired with the seeming inability and incompetence of European politicians to 
deal with the dual crises of economy and immigration. 
Further, as Karen Sykes (2016) notes, many people over the following 
days said they had not thought the election result would lead to Brexit. They 
were indeed voting against austerity politics, immigration, and big business, 
but many, it would seem, had not planned on losing the privileges of EU 
membership. Similar voices could be heard in both Italy and Greece after 
referendums there—everyone appeared to have a different interpretation of 
what the question on the ballot actually meant (or implied) vis-à-vis future 
membership in the European project. As demonstrated by Insa Koch (2017), 
the premises on which people voted were a far cry from the supposedly 
simple binary of a referendum question. 
Varied and contradictory interpretations of the referendum result were 
not difficult to find at my university. The department in which I work at the 
University of St. Andrews hosts both a Centre for Cosmopolitan Studies and 
a Centre for Minorities Studies. St. Andrews is a university that once had 
John Stuart Mill, the champion of liberalism, freedom, and individuality, as 
its lord rector, the representative of students who spoke truth to institutional 
power. A university, incidentally, to which Boris Johnson sent his daughter to 
study, choosing to attend her graduation ceremony on the day of the 
referendum. A small-town home to over 150 nationalities enshrined in its 
cosmopolitan bubble, even by the pro-Remain standards of Scotland, St. 
Andrews was hit particularly hard by the Leave vote (on educational capital, 
see Gusterson 2017). Since the referendum there has ensued a power 
struggle among the Conservative Party government, the courts, the 
European Union, and the constitutive devolved administrations of the United 
Kingdom as to the direction of future negotiations. During this struggle 
people like Dennis and Giovanna have been trying to unpack the affective 
and practical complexities of Brexit. 
In discussions with my colleagues, students, and friends in Scotland, I 
have noticed two key topics regularly resurfacing: temporality and 
cosmopolitanism. Both themes are intrinsically linked to reconstituted 
futures filled with new anxieties, expectations, and speculations. For many 
British people, and particularly in towns such as St. Andrews, everyday life 
has for decades been defined by cosmopolitanism—a recent past folded into 
a protracted present built on intimate interaction with the Other. In short, 
cosmopolitanism based on individual freedoms, tolerance, and social liberties 
has been a cornerstone of previous temporalities of Scottish European 
belonging (Lino e Silva and Wardle 2016; Rapport 2012b). The Brexit vote 
has thrown cosmopolitanism into suspension, leaving people like Dennis, 
Giovanna, and myself to question their past beliefs about the cosmopolitan 
project, as well as its present conditions and future trajectories. 
Of course, this is not the case for swathes of the British public that 
welcomed the Brexit vote with euphoria. Yet, as important as it may be to 
understand why 52 percent of the electorate voted Leave, it is also essential 
to try to comprehend how those who feel they lost the referendum envision 
their lives in Brexit Britannia, fearing that their work and family life may be 
irrevocably altered. The uncertainty has affected how some in Scotland have 
thought about their temporal trajectories and emergent (or not) 
cosmopolitan futures, which have become entwined with the nationalist 
projects of both Edinburgh and London. 
[h1]Lost in Brexit: The vortex of the present and suspended 
cosmopolitanism 
[ni]A once-unyielding version of Scotland’s future is now past, or at least on 
hold: a future in which Scotland is tied to a particular kind of European 
cosmopolitanism, involving closer cultural integration, freedom of work and 
movement, tariff-less trade, and boundless socioeconomic prosperity. From 
my own experience growing up in the cultural renaissance era of 1990s New 
Labour Britain—an era known as Cool Britannia, which was full of optimism 
about what the new millennium might bring—belonging to a cosmopolitan 
Europe riding high on its most recent plans for tighter integration in the form 
of the monetary union was the birthright of a whole generation.2 The fairy 
tale began to fracture with fiscal troubles in the mid-2000s, especially after 
the bursting of the US housing bubble led to the collapse of financial 
companies and a global economic downturn. 
Temporal disorientation is a prominent feature in situations of crisis 
and chronic uncertainty. In Greece, where I have conducted research since 
2003 and which serves as a source of comparison on turbulent relations with 
Europe, the impact of fiscal instability has been particularly harsh, with the 
economic turmoil and the subsequent austerity measures imposed as part of 
three international bailout packages (Knight 2015). After nearly three 
decades of prosperity, aspirations for the future were quite violently torn 
away from my research participants to be replaced by austerity, 
unemployment, fears of hunger, and social destitution. 
People in Greece reported feelings of intense temporal vertigo: 
confusion and anxiety about where and when they belong in overarching 
time lines of pasts and futures. My research participants described feeling 
“dizzy” and “nauseous” with this confusion, of being lost, suspended, or 
trapped in time (Knight 2016, 35). With lowering living standards, some 
people said they felt as though they had been “thrown back in time” to 
“premodern,” “pre-European” eras of poverty and suffering, while others 
discussed their experiences of the crisis as reliving multiple moments from 
the past assembled in the present. 
Although not yet so extreme because Brexit has predominantly fueled 
imaginations for potential adversities yet to come, similar feelings of 
temporal vertigo and suspended futures are being experienced by some in 
postreferendum Britain. Crisis often stimulates how people think about time, 
whether tilted in the direction of historicizing, presentifying, or futural 
thought. As Charles Stewart and I have recently argued, “In moments of 
extreme crisis, time becomes elastic—the time waiting for a bomb to explode 
or a fist to land can seem like an eternity, or a blink of the eye” (Knight and 
Stewart 2016, 3). 
For instance, discussing the referendum outcome with colleagues at 
St. Andrews and further afield, I started to realize that we were living 
firsthand what Rebecca Bryant (2014, 2016) has termed the “uncanny 
present”—the feeling of existing in an elongated, hyperconscious present 
that is under exaggerated interrogation. At a time of uncertainty, “we 
acquire a sense that what we do in this present will be decisive for both the 
past and the future, giving to the present the status of a threshold” (Bryant 
2016, 20). The present is brought into consciousness, creating an unusually 
overburdened perception of presentness: the present becomes “uncanny.” 
The familiar is made strange. The present feels “distorted and disturbed” 
owing to the looming edifice of crisis leaking through its cracks. For instance, 
the morning after Donald Trump’s election, a Democrat-supporting US PhD 
student in my department described how, after waking at 7 a.m. and fearing 
the worst, she had stayed in bed with her headphones in and music turned 
up extra loud as she tried to savor “the last few minutes of normality” before 
her world was turned upside down. She tried to block out or at least delay 
the future by elongating the now. “I didn’t want to leave the comfort of the 
present,” she remarked. 
One may also think of this hyperconscious reflection on the present in 
terms of Ernesto de Martino’s (2012) “crisis of presence,” in which one can 
have out-of-body experiences, on the ceiling or the other side of the room, 
watching oneself suffering. The reality of the present—one’s historicity, the 
historical continuity grounding the present—is momentarily lost. The 
uncertainty caused by the referendum has obliged some sections of the 
British population to critically contemplate everyday activities and rights that 
they had formerly taken for granted—such as the right of other European 
nationals to work in the United Kingdom, which now occupies Dennis’s mind 
day and night. 
Other orientations to the future are also pertinent to the 
postreferendum vibe in Britain: speculation, expectation, anticipation, 
potentiality, hope and their flip sides of resignation, apathy, exhaustion. 
When EU nationals and Remain supporters in Scotland discuss futures of 
cosmopolitanism and individual freedoms, anxieties and speculative 
hypothesizing reach previously unprecedented levels, and political speeches 
and television newsreels are eagerly anticipated, to be dissected in an often-
fruitless search for a glimmer of hope. 
As an observation of potentiality, speculation—the forming of a 
conjecture without firm evidence—offers a mode of participation in the 
future that may be facilitated or curtailed by Brexit. Speculation goes along 
with a distinctive temporal disposition toward creatively contemplating some 
possibilities while excluding others (Weszkalnys 2015, 623). Speculation 
from the present as to what both the Brexit and the Trumpocene future 
might hold often pushes us into unknown realms on topics of warfare, 
financial trading, and climate change. Speculation in a Europe in the clutches 
of chronic political and economic turmoil is currently personal, societal, 
industrial, involving intense conjecture about what form a postapocalyptic 
future might take. 
[h1]Scotland: Britain’s cosmopolitan heartland? 
[ni]Dennis and Giovanna see a perverse temporal contradiction between the 
Brexit vote and the electoral victory of Donald Trump in the United States 
nearly five months later. Trump’s election, they suggest, signals a temporary 
change of direction for US citizens. But while Trump’s presidency is now a 
certainty, Brexit will be a permanent change but, with all the uncertainty, 
may never happen at all. The level of precariousness surrounding a deal that 
has permanent (or at least long-term) consequences, Dennis argues, makes 
it all the more important for his partner to secure residency rights and 
eventually apply for British citizenship. They cannot live with the physical 
and psychological effects of chronic uncertainty stoked by media hyperbole 
and scaremongering. 
Since the Brexit vote, Scottish first minister Nicola Sturgeon has 
released a string of statements supporting the rights of EU nationals to live 
and work in Scotland, promising to fight “inhumane” Westminster tactics 
holding foreign nationals as “hostages” in Brexit negotiations (Brooks and 
Severin 2016). On June 24, 2016, the day after the referendum, she spoke 
at Bute House in Edinburgh: 
[ex]Yesterday, Scotland—like London and Northern Ireland—voted 
overwhelmingly to remain in the EU. . . . We voted to safeguard our 
freedom to travel, live, work and study in other European countries. 
. . . Indeed, I want to take the opportunity this morning to speak 
directly to citizens of other EU countries living here in Scotland—you 
remain welcome here, Scotland is your home and your contribution is 
valued. . . . I am proud of Scotland and how we voted yesterday. We 
proved that we are a modern, outward looking, open and inclusive 
country. (BBC News 2016a) 
Her rhetoric supporting residency rights and her attempts to secure a 
place for Scotland at the negotiating table on the terms of Brexit has been 
highly praised among diverse Scottish publics, even those who did not 
support the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) in the 2014 independence 
referendum. 
Indeed, in St. Andrews and further afield in Edinburgh (two towns 
staunchly opposed to both Scottish independence and Brexit), people from 
across the political spectrum and electoral demographics are reconsidering 
their stance on Scottish independence. The SNP has openly challenged the 
UK government position that people can be placed neatly into “categories 
and classes that (they happen) to find (themselves) by accident of birth or of 
later circumstance” (Rapport 2010, 464). Acknowledging how it is becoming 
more difficult to distinguish between the politics of left and right (Holmes 
2000), many people, me included, feel awkward about a nationalist party 
becoming the progressive voice of cosmopolitanism, freedom, and social 
liberty, and remain suspicious of shadowy ulterior political motives and the 
lack of substantial policy in place to support somewhat overblown claims. 
Sturgeon’s words, however, do carry wide appeal and speak for everyday 
Scots who oppose the political domination (historical and current) of the 
Conservative English upper classes, which regularly implement cutbacks, 
provoke crises, and impoverish the rest. Sturgeon has a somewhat cult 
superhero status. She has managed to build on her previous reputation for 
caring, progressive political futures—in contrast to her steely predecessor, 
Alex Salmond—to wide appeal and has become a central figure in the 
imaginative support networks of EU nationals in Scotland. A text from a 
Greek student studying at another Scottish university read “Power! Nicola 
Sturgeon kicks ass. She is here to save the day. Watch out dirty Tories.” A 
Greek friend, Katerina, who lives in Scotland, sent me a picture message of 
Conservative former prime minister David Cameron on the telephone with 
Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras asking for advice on how to perform a U-
turn and transform a no vote into a yes. 
Networks of affective support among migrants in Scotland became 
even more apparent in October 2016 after the Conservative Party 
conference, in which UK Home Secretary Amber Rudd announced plans to 
make universities “more discriminating” in the courses they offer to foreign 
students and to force businesses to disclose how many foreign workers they 
employ, leading to accusations that the government’s plans had crossed the 
boundary into “racism” (BBC News 2016b). Further speeches have 
championed cosmopolitanism in Scottish society, industry, and education, 
emphasized the important contribution of European nationals to the Scottish 
economy, and issued reminders about the rich history of multiculturalism 
and liberty in Scotland since the Enlightenment (Lino e Silva and Wardle 
2016). 
Cosmopolitanism is concerned with the plurality of human freedom, 
with openness and individual expression (Wardle 2010, 386). But the 
emergent cosmopolitanism in Scotland seems to be fused with a nationalist 
agenda. For Dennis, like me, cosmopolitanism was part of a long-standing 
vision for a British nation, something he shared with other Brits, especially 
fellow Englishmen, or as he put it, “an appreciation of different cultural 
backgrounds and a duty to welcome any human being who turns up on your 
doorstep.” Cosmopolitanism, Dennis believed, was an existential condition, 
what might be described as “a moral quality that is embedded in social 
practices” (Josephides 2010, 394) of being British. Now the waters are 
murkier, with cosmopolitanism at the center of the nationalist rhetoric for an 
independent Scotland. But nationalist affirmations of identity ride on the 
back of landmark events—they are plural and situational, taking countless 
forms (Rapport 2012b, 68, 70). It is quite possible to express oneself 
through the trope of metamorphosed nationalism while behaving with civility 
and upholding the virtues of a social democracy. Cosmopolitanism can 
emerge through unusual channels, and a significant political event, such as 
Brexit, provides an alternative route for claims to cosmopolitanism. 
The universal yet individual human being “has both the capacity and 
the right to develop a world-view that fits them personally” (Rapport 2010, 
465; see also Rapport 2012a), a right, if unanimously granted and 
respected, that can be a double-edged sword in the case at hand. In the 
current moment, there seems to be a need to name collectivities, as 
liberalism is replaced by “cultural communities” that are ascribed fixed 
identities. This is precisely what Sturgeon does when she constructs the 
result of the Brexit vote in terms of regions rather than individuals—
“Scotland, London, Northern Ireland voted to remain”—another form of 
collectivization that seems to rule out the possibility that the Dundonian 
Remainer may have more in common with the Mancunian Remainer than 
with the Dundonian Leaver, an example of how Brexit might help create new 
forms of relatedness along political lines (Balthazar 2017). For the average 
Remainer (if there is such a character), ideals of freedom, tolerance, and 
social liberty are constructed according to a particular kind of 
cosmopolitanism related to the category of “Europe.” 
Although categorization is difficult to avoid, many people whom I have 
spoken to since the Brexit referendum have suggested that the cosmopolitan 
project should stare down the strategic essentialism from both sides and 
demonstrate how “a politics of identity based on collective categorizations is 
deemed neither true nor just” (Rapport 2010, 470). Paradoxical though it 
might seem, some Remain supporters in Scotland might try to undermine 
essentialism by supporting a nationalist party—in some cases even against 
their own better judgment—because it claims the universal right to pursue 
human potentiality across hegemonic categories. 
[h1]The way we were 
[ni]The global economic downturn and years of austerity politics have 
formed the basis for a succession of divisive election and referendum 
campaigns. “I could understand if it were Greece that decided to leave 
Europe,” said a colleague who has devoted his life to Hellenic studies. “All 
that pent-up anger against European bankers and bureaucrats [. . .] in 
Greece there is a real reason to want to get out of Europe, away from all 
their meddling and tutelage that has had such an impact on the quality of 
life for the everyday person.” The observable effect of EU membership in the 
life of the everyday Brit, my colleague suggested, is for the most part 
negligible. 
Further, much of the anxiety of Remain supporters and EU nationals is 
based on the potential negative implications of Brexit Britain, their 
speculation about uncertain futures. Brexit has stirred up numerous adverse 
potentialities while Greeks are already living the consequences of crisis. Yet, 
although Greece has been brought to its knees by seven years of wage cuts, 
job losses, and new taxes, support there for the European project remains 
strong. Despite continued discontent with tactics employed by their 
creditors, my research participants often expressed a stout sense of 
European belonging based on notions of Europe as the home of social 
progress, modernity, liberty, and civilization—what one is inclined to 
cautiously term “cosmopolitanism” (Knight 2017). 
Perhaps my colleague is out of touch with the “everyday Brit.” He, like 
me, is an Englishman who certainly understands more about his chosen site 
of ethnographic study than the politics of the country where he was born and 
raised. Many academics seem to have been surprised by both the Brexit 
referendum and the US election results, possibly highlighting just how 
estranged we are from the grassroots reality of the places we call home. 
Furthermore, we may feel that it is difficult for us to do justice to the 
moment in any meaningful way. 
In the months since the Brexit vote, two recurrent themes have 
punctuated discourse from the side of Remain supporters and EU citizens 
living in Scotland—the sense of being trapped in the temporal moment and 
confusion about futures of cosmopolitanism that seem linked to a Scottish 
nationalist agenda. Fears over suspended cosmopolitan futures are but one 
aspect of intense temporal vertigo, the disorientation felt by a particular 
section of the population. As Sarah Green (2016) has argued, the 
postreferendum times we are living in constitute a “new normal” of 
uncertainty, but with renewed political accountability. While for some 
residents of the United Kingdom the new normal of uncertainty has a very 
old and familiar feel, for people like Dennis, Giovanna, Katerina, and me, the 
new normal does not feel normal at all. 
 
[h1]Notes 
Acknowledgments. For innumerable engaging conversations on Brexit 
Scotland, I am particularly grateful to my colleagues Sabine Hyland, 
Stavroula Pipyrou, Nigel Rapport, and Huon Wardle and, away from St. 
Andrews, Debbora Battaglia, Rebecca Bryant, Gillian Evans and Carol 
Greenhouse. The three anonymous reviewers provided extensive feedback 
worthy of a full-length research article, comments which I have fallen well 
short of doing justice. I thank the Forum editors for the generous invitation 
and Pablo Morales for his insights and patience in the copyediting process. 
1. All names of interlocutors are pseudonyms. 
2. “Cool Britannia” was experienced in different ways among the youth 
of the time and not always with the optimism I witnessed. As always in the 
United Kingdom, regional, class, and generational differences play significant 
roles in how the late 1990s are remembered. 
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